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tions. He shows how the modern press, a relatively new factor in international relations, has tended generally to be chauvinistic, but maintains that in diplomacy thought must be had for the remote day, hidden from the journalist and party politician, if statesmanship is to prevail and the reign of law is to be maintained in the world. He enumerates as the chief causes of war: (1) lust for territory, (2) religion, (3) protection of rights of nationals, (4) commerce and trade, (5) protection of the weak, (6) fear.

With the increasing participation of the people in affairs, Lord Bryce is of the opinion that there must be a greater degree of publicity of the facts in regard to international relations, and that these facts should be furnished from official sources in order that partizan and sensational misrepresentation may not mislead. He is, nevertheless, convinced that certain negotiations may still best be carried on in private conference.

Arbitration and conciliation are given a high place by Lord Bryce among the methods of possible settlement of disputes among states. Of the League of Nations plan he says, "Imperfect it may be, but it is the only plan which has yet been launched with any prospect of success".

Out of his ripe experience, and with the warmest regard for Americans and American institutions, Lord Bryce declares in his closing address,

Such as the citizens are, such will the leaders be, because they desire to please the citizens. If the citizens are swayed by impulses of vanity and ambition, their leaders will try to win support by playing up or playing down to such passions. If, on the other hand, the citizens demand from those who guide the State uprightness and fair dealing and a considerate respect for the rights of others, and if they reprobate and dismiss any statesman who falls below the moral standard they set up, their leaders will try to conform to that standard. . . . What all the nations now need is a public opinion which shall in every nation give more constant thought and keener attention to international policy, and lift it to a higher plane.

GEORGE GRAFTON WILSON.

The Mind in the Making: the Relation of Intelligence to Social Reform. By JAMES HARVEY ROBINSON. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1921. Pp. 235. \$2.50.)

DEEPLY impressed by the evils of the present social order, impatient with all who blindly accept it, and disappointed in the efforts at reform by changing the administration, spiritual exhortation, and education as commonly pursued, the author of this book finds hope and remedy in the freedom of intelligence. By this he means not reverie, nor the rationalizing of motives derived from habit and tradition, but creative thinking like that which produced our modern science and invention. But this required its founders to "discard practically all the consecrated notions of the world and its workings which had been held by the best

and wisest and purest of mankind down to three hundred years ago" What is now needed is similar intelligence applied to the study of man in his social relations. For while our knowledge and control of the physical world has achieved such notable triumphs, "our scientific knowledge and regulation of human affairs has remained almost stationary for over two thousand years".

Violent prejudices in current beliefs and habits of thinking oppose this application. The author aims to trace these obstacles historically to their source, to perform, so to say, a kind of Freudian analysis on the human mind at large. At the same time he points out the way advances have hitherto been made. Accordingly the major part of the book is taken up with discussions of our animal and savage ancestry; the beginning of critical thinking in Greece, whose supreme contribution to human thought was scepticism; the influence of Plato and Aristotle; the origin of medieval civilization and our intellectual inheritance from that; finally, the scientific revolution and its effects. The main lessons to be learned from this survey are apparently, first, that our current social beliefs and attitudes are rooted in our past and maintained solely on this account, and, secondly, that progress in any direction has always been conditioned on breaking with the past and boldly pushing out into new paths. The book concludes with two chapters of which the one treats of the sickness of an acquisitive society with some recent instances, as the author holds them to be, of reaction (the Lusk Committee, etc.), while the other contains reflections on the philosophy of repression. The author proposes no specific reforms; his object is the more fundamental one of breaking our "shackles", changing our attitude to the problems.

But it is only in part that he essays the rôle of a Francis Bacon of the social sciences, for he suggests no new organon, no method of attacking the problems which is not being already applied, but contents himself in this regard with attacking the *idola* of established social and ethical tradition. No one surely will dispute the need of free, critical, and constructive thinking on social problems. But this is too vaguely general, and it is at least doubtful whether the mere appeal to intelligence is likely to be more effective in creating a new world order than the preaching of brotherly love which the author finds so disappointing. Moreover a bias strongly radical is as unfavorable to an impartial survey of the facts as one strongly conservative. A frequent comment suggested to the reviewer has been, adapting the words of Job, No doubt but ye are the people and wisdom was born with you. The book is full, as it seems to him, of crudities and exaggerations. When, for example, it is asserted (p. 11) that no publisher would accept a historical text-book based on an explicit statement of our present knowledge of man's animal ancestry, it is hard to believe that we are dealing with a statement of fact and not rather with an opinion expressing a prejudiced animus—the

same which declares that the American publishers adopted the short title, *The Acquisitive Society*, for Tawney's well-known book instead of the longer title of the article in the *Hibbert Journal* because they "evidently [*sic!*] thought it inexpedient to stress the contention of the author that modern society has anything fundamentally the matter with it" (p. 178 n.).

A similar bias shows itself in the treatment of the historical material. It is impressive, indeed, to contrast the comparatively short period of civilization with the long, long ages preceding it, and doubtless important inferences are to be drawn from it regarding the depth and persistence of our savage and animal inheritance. But there is room for some differences of opinion as to what these inferences should be; in any case the construction is from the nature of the case largely hypothetical. Here it is put forward with dogmatic assurance. We do not expect a sympathetic appreciation of the great systems of philosophy from one who, like our author, regards metaphysics as an indulgence like smoking, and we are not here disappointed. Much he understands about Plato! But he might at least have spared us the inaccuracies of such statements as that Aristotle was banished from Athens (p. 100) and that the Epicureans believed in the gods because, like Descartes, they thought we had an innate idea of them (p. 105). In the medieval mind he sees only its superstition, intolerance, mysticism (as though that were necessarily bad), and blind following of tradition, quite overlooking its historical values in the shaping of medieval society and in the discipline which prepared the way for modern culture. Equally unhistorical is the view which sees in the great epochs only radical revolt from the old and a beginning *de novo*; this is to ignore the historical factors of continuity and to make all progress catastrophic. Much that the author writes is stimulating and some of it is true; but he writes not as a historian who seeks to interpret and understand tradition, but as a reformer who sees in tradition only an enemy to "combat".

H. N. GARDINER.

International Law, chiefly as interpreted and applied by the United States. By CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, Professor of Law in Northwestern University. In two volumes. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1922. Pp. lix, 832; xxvii, 925. \$25.00.)

EVERY work on international law must necessarily bear the impress of the nationalistic prejudices of its origin, but in this case the author frankly aims to adopt the viewpoint of the American judges and officials who have been called upon to apply and therefore to interpret the rules of international law. Nevertheless Professor Hyde makes it clear that he understands the nature and limits of such state action; for after he has explained in a remarkable passage (I. 12) the real nature of local applications and interpretations of international law and the method of